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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action on a promissory note from 
Appellants to Respondent, and Appellants' Counterclaim 
for damages for breach of a construction contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court (Judge David B. Dee) granted 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on the promissory 
note and entered judgment accordingly, but in a separate 
Memorandum Decision refused to tax as costs the costs of 
taking Appellants' depositions. Appellants' Cotmterclaim 
was tried to a jury. The lower court (Judge Marcellus K. 
Snow) sustained Respondent's objections to the admissi-
bility of certain evidence offered by Appellants, where-
upon Appellants rested. The lower court then granted Re-
spondent's motion for a directed verdict and entered judg-
ment on the Counterclaim in favor of Respondent and against 
Appellants, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
AND CROSS-APPEAL 
Respondent seeks: 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. With respect to Appellants' Counter-
claim, affirmation of the judgment 
in favor of Respondent and against 
Appellants, no cause of action. 
2. Reversal of the Memorandum Decision 
refusing to tax the costs of taking 
Appellants' depositions and judgment 
with respect thereto in its favor, 
as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Official Report of Proceedings in the Trial 
Court will be referred to throughout this Brief by the 
letter "T" followed by the number of the specific page 
or pages referred to. Exhibits will be referred to as 
"EX" followed by the number of the specific exhibit or ex-
hibits referred to. The Defendants-Appellants and the 
Plaintiff-Respondent will be referred to throughout as 
"Owners" and "Contractor," respectively. 
As stated in the first paragraph of the Statement 
of Facts at page 3 of the Owners' brief, on or about August 
28, 1972, the parties entered into a Standard Form of Agree-
ment Between Owner and Contractor, EX D-3 (the "Contract"). 
However, contrary to the Statement of the Owners, construc-
tion of the nursing facility was originally to be completed 
on or before June 15, 1973 rather than June 15, 1972. See 
Article 3 of the Contract. 
-2-
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As stated in the third paragraph of the State-
ment of Facts on page 3 of the Owners' brief, completion 
of the drawings and specifications contemplated by the Con-
tract was delayed. However, contrary to the Statement of 
the Owners, the issue of who was responsible for such delay 
was resolved on or about January 3, 1973 by the parties' 
entering into Change Order No. 1 to the Contract, which 
Change Order extended the Date of Completion of construction 
until August l, 1973. See EX D-14. 
As stated in the Statement of Facts in the fourth 
paragraph on page 4 of the Owners' brief, the parties entered 
into Change Order No. 2 to the Contract. EX D-10. Change 
Order No. 2 was entered into on or about August 27, 1973. 
However, contrary to the Statement of the Owners that the· 
Owners had a valid claim against the Contractor for the delay 
in completion of construction, by Change Order No. 2, the 
parties memorialized their understanding and agreement that 
the execution of Change Order No. 2 would not waive any claim 
the Owners may have had against the Contractor by reason of 
the Contractor's failure to complete the project on or before 
August 1, 1973. 
As stated in the Statement of Facts in the second 
paragraph on page 5 of the Owners' brief, on or about March 
1, 1974, the parties entered into Change Order No. 4 to the 
-3-
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Contract. EX P-5 and EX P-6. However, what the Statement 
of the Owners failed to say was that by Change Order No. 
4, the Contract Time as provided in the Contract was "in-
creased as necessary to complete the work." 
Contrary to the implication in the Statement of 
Facts in the fourth paragraph on page 5 of the Owners' 
brief, Change Order No. 4 did not constitute a new or separate 
agreement between the parties, but became instead an integral 
part of the Contract. Counsel for the Owners agreed with 
that proposition when he stated at trial " ... it is apparent, 
certainly, by the wording, that the change orders become 
incorporated into the contract." T 37. 
Other than as stated above, the Contractor agrees 
with the Statement of Facts as contained in the Owners' 
brief. However, the record establishes one additional fact 
relevant to the Owners' appeal but not mentioned in their 
brief, viz: 
On or about March 8, 1974, six months 
prior to making final payment on the 
Contract, the Owners executed a Certi-
ficate of Substantial Completion pur-
suant to which they accepted the subject 
nursing facility as substantially com-
plete and assumed full possession there-
of as of that date. EX P-7. 
With respect to the Contractor's Cross-Appeal, the 
material facts are as follows: 
-4-
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On or about July 15, 1975, in paragraphs 3 and 6 
of their Answer and Counterclaim, the Owners denied that 
they "voluntarily" executed and delivered the promissory 
note of September 9, 1974 (the "Note"), and alleged that 
the Note was signed by them only as a result of the Contrac-
tor's duress. 
On or about May 20, 1976, Owner, Connie M. Davis, 
stated with respect to the Note in her sworn Affidavit the 
following: 
"2. That at the insistence of the plaintiff's 
agent, John Price, I executed the Promissory 
Note in question some time before September 11, 
1973, but that I would not have executed said 
Note but for his assertions that he could not 
and would not complete a nursing home facility 
under a Contract which was dated August 28, 1972, 
until I executed said Promissory Note." 
On or about May 20, 1976, Owner, Richard J. Davis, 
stated with respect to the Note in his sworn Affidavit the 
following: 
"2. That some time prior to September 11, 
1973 (sic), the plaintiff, by and through 
its agent, John Price, approached me and 
said to the effect that he could not complete 
the Contract dated August 28, 1972 for the 
construction of a nursing home facility pur-
suant to plans and specifications for the 
sum agreed upon of $720,000.00 without my 
signing a Promissory Note in the amount of 
$10,708.39. 
3. That but for John Price's insistence 
that he could not and would not complete the 
-5-
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project unless the Note were signed, I would 
not have executed the Note which was signed 
by me some time before September 11, 1973 (sic)." 
On or about July 8, 1976 in their sworn Answer to 
the Contractor's Interrogatory No. 1, the Owners stated the 
following: 
"On February 19, 1974, Change Order No. 4 
was presented to your affiants for signature 
by the plaintiff to increase to $722,282.00 
the original Contract amount, to pay for 
additional hardware on the doors of the nurs-
ing home facility as ordered by the State 
Fire Marshal. This Change Order was never 
executed by your affiants." (Emphasis added) 
On or about September 19, 1977, Owner, Richard J. 
Davis, stated in his sworn Affidavit the following: 
"2. That to the best of his recollection, 
the document entitled 'Change Order No. 4' 
was sent to his address for his signature 
on or about March 1, 1974 .... 
5. That your affiant does not remember 
any typing at the bottom of Change Order 
No, 4, and particularly does not remember 
the words typed in said document at the 
time he signed the same with the following 
wording: 'The Contract time will be in-
creased as necessary to complete the work.' 
6. That it was your affiant's practice 
to initial any wording to a contract which 
may have been crossed out, or any additional 
wording to a contract, but your affiant did 
not initial the crossing out of the wording 
and the adding of the new words described 
in paragraph 5 above on Change Order No. 4; 
however, your affiant believes that he would 
have initialed the same had he been present 
at the time they were presented to him." 
-6-
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On or about October 11, 1976, Owner, Richard J. 
Davis, testified under oath at his deposition with respect 
to the Note as follows: 
"Q You say Mrs. Davis and yourself went 
into Dangerfield's to sign that note? 
A Yes. 
Q He prepared it and you went in and signed 
it? 
A Yes. I believe that I have only been in 
his office that one time. 
Q But you went in and signed the note? 
A Yes. 
Q Was there any way he twisted your arm 
to sign it? 
A No. 
Q Was it an involuntary signing in any 
way? 
A Well, I thought that was the easiest 
way out, making payments per month rather 
than the full sum. 
Q Any undue influence by Mr. Dangerfield 
to make you sign it? 
A No. 
Q Any coercion or undue influence brought 
upon your wife to sign it? 
A No. 
Q How about the mortgage? 
A No. 
- 7-
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Q Anybody make any threats to you if you 
didn't? 
A No. 
Q Did you authorize him to deliver that 
note back to John Price Associates? 
A Did he deliver it? I don't know. 
Q Well, I think we'll find correspondence 
that he did and in your affidavit you said 
you thought he did. 
A Okay, then why ask me that question? 
Q I just want to know your best recollec-
tion of it. 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. Davis, you have indicated in cer-
tain documents on file in this action that 
somehow John Price Associates coerced or ex-
erted undue duress upon yourself and Mrs. 
Davis with respect to this matter. 
A Well, I don't think they're undue. All 
I keep saying is that the work wasn't com-
pleted. The contract was never completed 
on time and the interest rates went up and 
I lost the deal. That's what I claim. By 
the interest rates going up, I couldn't find 
anybody to loan me the money. 
Q I imagine you have the same complaints 
Mrs. Davis has about what John Price has done 
to delay the matter but in terms of undue du-
ress or influence upon you and Mrs. Davis, 
was there any undue duress or influence that 
was put upon you to sign that last note? 
MR. SPRATLING: Counsel, are you referring 
to a specific--
THE WITNESS: Turnbow called me. Isn't that 
the guy's name? 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q (By Mr. Linebaugh:) I'm just telling 
you that the documents filed by you and 
your counsel in this case indicate that 
you claimed you had some improper influ-
ence or duress imposed upon you by John 
Price Associates. 
A Well, sure, that fellow down there, 
that bookkeeper, called up all the time 
and said I had to sign a note there for 
them. 
Q How does that make it improper duress 
or undue influence or--
A Well, he has called up all the time. 
Q How did John Price Associates or any 
of its employees exercise their strong 
will over your weak will? 
A Well, they have got a lot more money 
then I have. 
MR. SPRATLING: I'm going to have to ob-
ject. Where are you referring to coercion 
in the counterclaim? 
MR. LINEBAUGH: You have an affirmative, 
duress, counsel. I'm talking about anyplace 
it appears, and it appears in the affidavit, 
in the pleadings, and in the answers to in-
terrogatories, counsel. 
MR. SPRATLING: If you allow me to point 
out to my client it may be--
Q (By Mr. Linebaugh:) If John Price 
Associates has exercised some undue influ-
ence over Mr. Davis, it seems to me he 
ought to be able to tell us. 
A Well, they called me down a couple of 
times, I think it's Turnbow, in discussing 
matters--! mean all kinds of matters. I 
went over to his office, Turnbow's, two or 
three times. 
-9-
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Q I'm giving you a chance to give us 
your best possible shot at us, the thing 
that's going to convince the jury that 
.Tohn Price Associates really took advan-
tage of the Davises. 
A Because they didn't do their work and 
complete the contract on time. 
Q How does that in any way convince you 
you ought to sign the promissory note? 
A Well, John Price is a good friend of 
the head of the bank downstairs. 
Q Go on, take your best shot. 
A Yes. I think they got together and 
made these extensions go on. I didn't want 
the extensions to go on. 
Q Anything else? 
A No." 
(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 41, line 18 through 
page 45, line 7.) 
On or about October 11, 1976, Owner, Richard J. 
Davis, testified at his deposition with respect to Change 
Order No. 4 as follows: 
"Q Directing your attention to Answer to 
Interrogatory Number One on page three, the 
second paragraph. It says, 'On February 19, 
1974, change order number four was presented 
to your affiants for signature by the plain-
tiff to increase to $722,282, the original 
contract amount, to pay for additional hard-
ware on the doors of the nursing home facil-
ity as ordered by the State Fire Marshal. 
This change order was never executed by your 
affiants.' I take it based on evidence pro-
duced it was never executed by Mrs. Davis, 
but you did execute change order number four. 
-10-
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MR. SPRATLING: Is this on the hardware or 
the doors? 
MR. LINEBAUGH: This is change order number 
four. 
MR. SPRATLING: That hasn't got anything to 
do with this. 
THE WITNESS: Not for just the hardware. 
That's not right there. 
MR. SPRATLING: I think that was the amount. 
That was two thousand something, $2,282. 
Q (By Mr. Linebaugh:) In any case, your-
self and Mrs. Davis' answer that says, 'This 
order was never executed by your affiants' 
is in error; is that right? 
A Yes. I did sign it? 
MRS. DAVIS: Yes, he did sign it." 
(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 84, line 19 through 
page 85, line 15.) 
On or about October 11, 1976, Owner, Connie M. 
Davis, testified at her deposition with respect to Change 
Order No. 4 as follows: 
"Q (By Mr. Linebaugh:) Now, I show you 
what has been marked as Exhibit 28, which 
is a change order number four, dated February 
19, 1974, and ask you if you have ever seen 
that document before? 
A Yes. I think we did see this one be-
cause this is part of what we had to pay, 
was the hardware; isn't it? 
MR. DAVIS: I paid the hardware. 
THE WITNESS: Or maybe I haven't seen that 
list. 
-11-
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Q (By Mr. Linebaugh:) Is it fair to say 
that at the time you saw this change order, 
the original of this change order--
A I'm not sure I did 
of the problem, but I'm 
specific change order. 
I didn't see it. 
see it. I was aware 
not sure I saw that 
I'm going to say no, 
Q With respect to the date of it, then, 
which is February 19, 1974, at least that's 
when Carl Olson signed it; and then your ar-
chitect signed it on March l, 1974, accord-
ing to the copy. 
A Yes. 
Q As of those dates it is fair to say you 
had a lease with Hillhaven; is it not? 
A Yes. 
Q And as part of your lease with Hillhaven, 
you are to furnish them this building; is that 
right? 
A Yes. 
Q And is it fair to say that the changes 
that were described in this change order were 
to be included in the building that was the 
subject of your lease with Hillhaven? 
MR. SPRATLING: She will not know that. I 
think when they talked about this, this hard-
ware was acceptable. I think it was a later 
change. I'm going to object to the question. 
MR. LINEBAUGH: I don't think it was in the 
original plans or the specs. I think these 
were later changes requested by Hillhaven 
regardless of when they came into being. 
Q (By Mr. Linebaugh:) Were these in fact 
not-required by your tenant? 
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A I don't know. I don't know whether 
it was the tenant that required them or 
the Fire Marshal or whoever required them. 
I just know that they were required. 
Q Well, it says, 'Furnish and install 
additional hardware on doors as directed 
by State Fire Marshal.' And you agreed to 
pick up the cost of that; did you not? 
A Yes. 
Q And this is the change order to accom-
plish that purpose; is that fair to say? 
A Yes, that·' s probably fair to say. 
Q And do you have any quarrel with this 
change order? 
A No. 
Q Do you know whether you have ever paid 
that amotmt of money to John Price and Asso-
ciates, the $2,282? 
A I think we did but I'm not going to say 
positively. I would have to look that up in 
my records. 
Q This change order also says, 'The con-
tract time will be increased as necessary 
to complete the work.' Do you have any 
quarrel with that provision? 
MR. SPRATLING: Where does it say that? 
MR. LINEBAUGH: Just above the signature 
marks, counsel. 
MR. SPRATLING: This is tmsigned. 
MR. LINEBAUGH: I know it's unsigned, but I 
just asked her if she has any quarrel with 
it, whether she signed it or not. 
-13-
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MR. SPRATLING: She stated time and time 
again that she thought they dillydallied 
around. 
MR. LINEBAUGH: I want to know, counsel. 
This is the crucial question. Did she agree 
as of this date that the contract time could 
be increased as necessary to complete this 
work; did you agree to that: 
THE WITNESS: I didn't feel it was neces-
sary to increase the contract time because 
it was so overtime now that this little bit 
of changing of hardware could not have made 
much difference. 
Q (By Mr. Linebaugh:) And you did not 
agree to that? 
A I did not. 
Q And if your husband did, he would have 
been crazy? 
A I did not say that and you are putting 
words in my mouth. 
Q Did you and your husband discuss whether 
that-was an agreeable term between you, as 
to whether the contract could be extended to 
complete that as necessary? 
A Yes. We discussed it and we decided no, 
we would not give any extensions on anything. 
Q 'No way,' and he said that to you? 
A And I said that to him. 
MR. DAVIS: You don't see my signature on there. 
(Whereupon Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 
was marked for identification.) 
Q (By Mr. Linebaugh:) I now sh~w you what 
has been marked as Exhibit 29 and ask you if 
you have ever seen that document before? 
-14-
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A I don't think I have seen it. 
Q Do you recognize your husband's signa-
ture on it? 
A Yes. 
Q Any reason to doubt that he signed 
that document? 
A No." 
(Deposition of Constance M. Davis, page 134, line 12 through 
page 138, line 5.) 
On or about October 11, 1976, Owner, Richard J. 
Davis, testified at his deposition with respect to the 
Owners' joint interest in the subject nursing home facility 
as follows: 
"Q Have you been a partner with your wife 
or been just alone in them? 
A Well, my wife and I run them together 
but there is no partnership." 
(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 6, lines 13 through 
16.) 
"Q With respect to the subject matter of 
this lawsuit, the rest home that was the sub-
ject of the contract that we are talking 
about, has your wife been extensively in-
volved in negotiating any of these trans-
actions along the line or was this pretty 
much your project? 
A I think we worked on them together. 
Q Did you take the lead in the negotia-
tions or did she? 
-15-
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A Oh, I think that maybe she took a lot 
of the lead, yes. 
Q Has there been anything that occurred 
between you that the other didn't agree to 
with respect to this transaction? 
A Well, in respect to the nursing home? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. I put it up for sale and didn't 
let her know about it. 
Q Anything else that she may have dis-
agreed with that you did in connection with 
this? 
A I don't think so. You see, I didn't 
own the property; she owned it." 
(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 9, line 8 through 
page 10, line 2.) 
"Q I suppose you mean you and your wife? 
A Yes. 
Q You were in this thing together? 
A Yes. But I don't have any idea when 
they were supposed to be paid." 
(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 31, lines 19 through 23.) 
On or about October 11, 1976 and after Owner, Richard 
J. Davis, had testified at his deposition with respect to the 
Owners' joint involvement in the subject nursing home facil-
ity, Owner, Connie M. Davis, testified at her deposition as 
follows: 
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"Q Now, with respect to any of the ques-
tions and answers that have been given di-
rected to your husband and given by your 
husband up to this moment, do you wish to 
change any of those answers? I realize that 
maybe it will be very difficult for you to 
do. If something sticks out in your mind 
that you know is obviously erroneous, then 
let's get at it. 
A The only thing that I could say is 
that most of the documents that you have 
referred to that we do not have I'm sure 
are on file with Cormnercial Security Bank. 
I think the reason for the redoing of the 
Phil-Rae Corporation lease was at the re-
quest of the S.B.A. And it was not a loan; 
it was a guaranteed lease." 
(Deposition of Constance M. Davis, page 10, lines 3 through 14.) 
Contrary to the lower court's Memorandum Decision 
of October 20, 1977, the Owners' depositions were used to 
rebut their contention at trial that the Owners were not 
jointly involved in the subject transaction. T 51-53. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE 
CONTRACTOR'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT. 
At page 2 of their brief, the Owners imply that 
the trial court's Order directing a verdict in favor of the 
Contractor somehow summarily cut off the Owners from present-
ing their case in chief. However, the Contractor's Motion 
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for a Directed Verdict was not made until after the Owners 
had rested their case. T 53 and 54. The Owners rested 
their case because the trial court sustained the Contrac-
tor's objection to the admissibility of any evidence re-
lating to any breaches of contract, which breaches al-
legedly occurred prior to March 1, 1974, the date of 
Change Order No. 4, and/or final payment of the Contrac-
tor on or about September 12, 1974. Thus, the real is-
sue in this case is whether the trial court correctly sus-
tained the objection. The Contractor contends that the 
trial court correctly sustained the objection for two 
reasons: (1) Change Order No. 4 superseded Change Order 
No. 2; and (2) by payment of all sums due the Contractor, 
the Owners waived any claim they may have had for unsatis~ 
factory prosecution of the work. 
A. CHANGE ORDER NO. 4 SUPERSEDED CHA.~GE ORDER 
NO. 2. At page 7 of their brief, the Owners concede that 
Change Orders l, 2 and 4 "were executed by the parties." 
Change Orders number 2 and 4 are the only ones pertinent 
to the issues now before the court. 
At pages 8 through the first paragraph on page 
10 of their brief, the Owners cite several authorities for 
the proposition that written suLsequent amendments, altera-
tions and/or modifications of a written contract and/or 
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written changes thereto, will supersede the earlier docu-
ments. The proposition is elementary and clearly supports 
the Contractor's contention that Change Order No. 4 super-
seded Change Order No. 2 to the extent that the provisions 
of both are inconsistent. 
When the parties entered into the Contract on 
August 28, 1972, they agreed that: 
"8.1 The Contract Documents consist of 
this Agreement (which includes the 
general conditions), Supplementary 
and other Conditions, the Drawings, 
the Specifications, all Addenda is-
sued prior to the execution of this 
Agreement, all Amendments, Change 
Orders, and written interpretations 
of the Contract Documents issued by 
the Architect. These form the Con-
tract and what is required br any 
one shall be as binding as i re-
quired by all. The intention of 
the Contract Documents is to in-
clude all labor, materials, equip-
ment and other items as provided 
in paragraph 11.2 necessary for 
the proper execution and comple-
tion of the Work, and the terms 
and conditions of payment therefor, 
and also to include all Work which 
may be reasonably inferable from the 
Contract Documents as being neces-
sary to produce the intended results. 
8.3 The term "Work" as used in the Con-
tract Documents includes all labor 
necessary to produce the construc-
tion required by the Contract Docu-
ments and all materials and equipment 
incorporated or to be incorporated in 
such construction." (Emphasis added) 
EX D-3, paragraphs 8.1 and 8.3. 
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From the foregoing, it is apparent that "Change Orders" 
were considered "Contract Documents" and were integrated 
into the "Contract." It is also clear that "Work" was 
a term of art when used in the Contract Documents which 
together formed the Contract. 
The Contract also provided: 
"16.2 If the Contractor is delayed at 
any time in the progress of the 
Work by changes ordered in the 
Work, by labor disputes, fire, 
unusual delay in transportation, 
unavoidable casualties, causes 
beyond the Contractor's control, 
or by any cause which the Archi-
tect may determine justifies the 
delay, then the Contract Time 
shall be extended by Change 
Order for such reasonable time 
as the Architect may determine. 
22.1 The Owner without invalidating the 
Contract may order Changes in the 
Work consisting of additions, de-
letions or modifications, the Con-
tract Sum and the Contract Time 
being adjusted accordingly. All 
such Changes in the Work shall be 
authorized by written Change Order 
signed by the Owner or the Archi-
tect as his duly authorized agent. 
22.2 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that "Con-
tract Sum" and "Contract Time" were terms of art when 
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used in the Contract Documents, which Contract Documents 
included Change Orders. 
On August 27, 1973, in Change Order No. 2, the 
Owners expressly reserved "any claim which they may have 
against Contractor by reason of Contractor's failure to 
complete the project on or before August 1, 1973." (Em-
phasis added). However, over six months later, on March l, 
1974, the Owners and their Architect agreed to Change 
Order No. 4 which expressly provided that "the Contract 
Time will be increased as necessary to complete the work." 
EX P-6. There can be no question but what Change Order 
No. 4 was an amendment as to both the Contract Sum and 
the Contract Time provided for in the Contract. This is 
clear from the fact that Change Order No. 4 expressly 
indicates that it is a Change Order with respect to a 
Contract dated August 28, 1972 for the "Davis Nursing 
Home" and that the original Contract Sum of $720,000.00 
would be increased to $722,282.00. 
The Owners argue that even though Change Order 
No. 4 changed the Contract, it did not supersede the 
express reservation of a potential claim provided for in 
Change Order No. 2. The obvious answer to that is that 
the Contractor simply cannot be held responsible for not 
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completing the Work on August 1, 1973 when the Owners 
contracted for additional labor and materials over six 
months later. Note that Change Order No. 4 did not 
merely extend the Contract Time as did Change Order No. 
2, but Change Order No. 4 also obligated the Contrac-
tor to furnish additional labor and materials as well 
as obligated the Owners for an additional Contract Sum 
and enough additional Contract Time to complete the Work. 
In other words, the Work as contemplated by the ori-
ginal Contract was amended to include the additional work 
as contemplated by Change Order No. 4 and it was impos-
sible for the Contractor, by August 1, 1973, to have done 
the Work as contemplated by the Contract DocUI!lents taken 
as a whole. Consequently, it does not make sense to say 
that any claim reserved by Change Order No. 2 would not 
be abrogated by Change Order No. 4. On the contrary, 
it does not make sense any other way. How can the Owners 
be allowed on the one hand to collect damages from the Con-
tractor for failure to complete the Work by August 1, 
1973 and at the same time obligate the Contractor to in-
clude in that Work additional labor and materials that 
were not even ordered until more than six months later. 
Remember, "Work" has a well defined meaning in the Con-
tract and Change Order No. 4, and there is nothing in 
Change Order No. 2 that changes that meaning. 
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Not only did the Owners agree to Change Order 
No. 4, but a week later on March 8, 197L;, the Owners 
executed a Certificate of Substantial Completion. EX 
P-7. Neither Change Order No. 4 nor the Certificate of 
Substantial Completion reserved in any way any claim in 
favor of the Owners based on the Contractor's failure to 
prosecute the Work to completion by August 1, 1973. 
Under such circumstances, the case_ law clearly es tab"." 
lishes the proposition that the Owners waived their al-
leged claim. In Steenberg Construction Co. v. Prepakt 
Concrete Co., 381 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1967), the court 
had under consideration a subcontract with respect to 
c-0nstruction of the earthen dam at Lost Creek, Utah. 
At the insistence of the subcontractor, the parties had 
negotiated an additional provision to the subcontract 
which stated: "Progress schedule date to be mutually 
agreed upon in writing ... " The subcontractor contended 
that it was released from any of its obligations under 
the subcontract because the parties never did agree in 
writing to any progress schedule. However, Judge Murrah, 
writing for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that 
the subcontractor waived the requirement of a written 
work schedule by the subcontractor's subsequent execu-
tion of a performance bond and its oral agreement to 
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perform the subcontract pursuant to a work schedule not 
agreed to in writing. In the case at bar, there is also 
a contract modification insisted upon by the Owners (Change 
Order No. 2), but there is also the subsequent written 
modification agreed to by the parties (Change Order No. 
4). If the oral agreement in SteenbeE_g constituted a 
waiver, ~ fortiorL the Owners waived the subject claim 
by the written provisions of Change Order No. 4 and the 
Certificate of Substantial Completion. 
Further, as late as 1974 in a case similar 
to the one now before the court, the Colorado Supreme 
Court has held in Rockwell v. Mountain View Electric 
Association, Inc., co. , 521 P.2d 1272 (1974) 
that the execution of change orders can reasonably be 
considered acts inconsistent with an alleged intent to 
hold a contractor to the requirements of a provision 
requiring completion of a construction project by a 
time certain. 
While the execution of Change Order No. 2 did 
not cause the Owners to waive any claim based on the 
Contractor's failure to complete the project by August 
1, 1973, the execution of the subsequent documents surely 
constituted such a waiver. Accordingly, it would have 
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been a waste of time for the trial court to admit evi-
dence before the jury with respect to whether the Con-
tractor justifiably failed to complete the Work by August 
1, 19i3. 
There are three errors in the Owners' brief 
which should be noted: (1) In the next to the last para-
graph on page 7, the Owners indicate that the completion 
date was extended by Change Order No. 2 to a date beyond 
"August 1, 1977;" however, the date which appears twice 
in that paragraph should be "August 1, 1973." EX D-10; 
(2) in the next to the last paragraph on page 11, the 
Owners contend that the Contractor conceded at trial 
"that the provisions of Change Order Number Two would 
still be alive, except for the payoff by the Owners of 
the Contract on September 12, 1974;" however, a reading 
of all of the last three-quarters of page 46 of the 
trial transcript (although less than a complete trans-
cript of all that was said), indicates that the Contrac-
tor made no such concession; and (3) in the last sentence 
of the last paragraph on page 11, the Owri.ers stated: 
"the Contractor, knowing it was in default, still agreed 
to be liable to the Owner for delay damages, while at the 
same time seeking an extension in which to complete the 
Contract;" however, there is nothing in the record to 
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indicate that the Contractor admitted at any time that 
it was in default, nor is there anything in the record 
to indicate that the Contractor agreed to be liable to 
the Owners for delay damages, even though the Contrac-
tor did agree that as of August 27, 1973, the Owners 
had reserved any claim they "may" have had against the 
Contractor. EX D-10. 
B. BY PAYMENT OF ALL SUMS DUE THE CONTRAC-
TOR, THE OWNERS WAIVED ANY CLAIM THEY MAY HAVE HAD FOR 
UNSATISFACTORY PROSECUTION OF THE WORK. At page 12 of 
their brief, the Owners concede that paragraph 17.4 of 
the original Contract "provides that final payment by 
the Owner does constitute a waiver of all claims of 
the Owner against the Contractor, with four exceotions, 
none of which probably apply here." (Emphasis added). 
The Owners then contend that Change Order No. 2 consti-
tuted a "fifth exception" to the waiver provided for in 
paragraph 17.4. 
Subsequent to August 27, 1973, the date of 
Change Order No. 2, the Owners agreed to the provisions 
of Change Order No. 4, EX P-6; the Certificate of Sub-
stantial Completion, EX P-7; the letter of September 
4, 1974 from Owner, Richard J. Davis, to Cormnercial 
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Security Bank authorizing the bank to make final pay-
ment to the Contractor, EX P-8; and the letter of 
September 12, 1974 from Commercial Security Bank to the 
Contractor transmitting such final payment, EX P-9. 
However, there is nothing in any of such subsequent 
documents preserving any such fifth exception. 
It is one thing to say that by entering into 
Change Order No. 2 that the Owners did not waive any 
claim they may have had for the Contractor's failure to 
complete the Work by August 1, 1973, and quite another 
thing to say that final payment over a year later and 
over nine months after the November 30, 1973 completion 
deadline of Change Order No. 2, and over six months after 
Change Order No. 4 and the Certificate of Substantial 
Completion, did not waive any such claim pursuant to the 
plain language of paragraph 17.4 of the Contract. Note 
that paragraph 17.4 says that final payment constitutes 
the waiver, and note also that Change Order No. 2 ex-
pressly provides that the construction lender would con-
tinue to disburse "funds for construction purposes per 
the terms and conditions of the Contract." (Emphasis 
added). There is nothing in Change Order No. 2 that 
indicates that paragraph 17.4 does not mean precisely 
what it says. This court has previously held that "no 
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damage" clauses in construction contracts (which clauses 
are more harsh than the waiver clause now under considera-
tion) mean what they say and are enforceable. See Western 
Engineers, Inc. v. State Road Commission, 20 U.2d 294, 427 
P.2d 216 (1968). 
The applicable rule of law with respect to waiv-
er is included in the following from Williston on Contracts: 
" 'Where timely performance is of the 
essence of the contract, a party who 
does any act inconsistent with the 
supposition that he continues to hold 
the other party to his part of the 
agreement will be taken to have waived 
it altogether. When a specific time 
is fixed for the performance of a con-
tract and is of the essence of the 
contract and it is not performed by 
that time, but the parties proceed 
with the performance of it after that 
time, the right to suddenly insist 
upon a forfeiture for failure to per-
form within the specified time will 
be deemed to have been waived and the 
time for performance will be deemed 
to have been extended for a reason-
able time.' " 6 Williston, Contracts, 
§856 p. 232 (3d ed. 1962) 
In the instant case, the execution and delivery of Change 
Order No. 4, the Certificate of Substantial Completion, 
the letter of September 4, 1974, and the letter and 
final payment of September 12, 1974, all constitute 
acts "inconsistent with the supposition that" t:ie Owners 
continued to hold the Contractor to the August 1, 1973 
completion date. 
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In light of the provisions of paragraph 17.4 
of the Contract, final payment alone surely constituted 
the Owners' waiver. In Milaeger Well Drilling Co. v. 
Muskego Rendering Co., 1 Wis.2d 573, 85 N.W.2d 331 (1957), 
it was held that even a partial payment effectively waived 
unreserved claims known to the owner at the time of par-
tial payment. Here, the Owners clearly knew about their 
alleged claim, but just as clearly made final payment 
on the Contract without any reservation of such claim. 
Based upon the fact that the Owners made final 
payment on the Contract as provided in paragraph 17.4 
thereof, such final payment clearly waived any claim the 
Owners may have had for the Contractor's unjustifiable 
failure to complete the project by August 1, 1973. Ac-
cordingly, the trial court was correct in ruling that 
evidence on that issue was irrelevant and immaterial. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
TAX THE COSTS OF TAKING THE OWNERS' 
DEPOSITIONS. 
The Contractor is aware that in order to re-
cover the costs of the Owners' depositions, the burden 
is upon the Contractor to establish that such depositions 
were necessary and reasonable and that whether that 
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burden was met was within the sound discretion of the 
lower court. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Wright,~ U.~,521 P.2d 563 (1974). However, the 
Contractor contends that the lower court's Memorandum 
Decision on this issue was arbitrary or a clear abuse 
of the court's discretion. 
The subject Memorandum Decision was not made 
until after the trial and judgment with respect to the 
Owners' Counterclaim, and the lower court's finding that 
the depositions were not used at trial is directly con-
trary to the trial transcript. The Owners' depositions 
were used at trial to rebut the Owners' contention that 
Owner, Richard J. Davis, was not acting for Owner, Connie 
M. Davis, with respect to the subject transaction. 
The error of the lower court is further demon-
strated by the fact that prior to the taking of the 
Owners' depositions, the Owners had taken the position 
under oath in affidavits and in answers to interrogatories 
that: (1) the Note had been signed under duress; and (2) 
that neither of the Owners had ever signed Change Order 
No. 4. Contrary to those assertions, the Owners' sub-
sequent depositions make clear that the Note was not 
signed under duress and Owner, Richard J. Davis, did in 
fact sign Change Order No. 4. Further, even after the 
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taking of the Owners' depositions, Owner, Richard J. 
Davis, took the position under oath in a sworn affi-
davit that certain key provisions of Change Order No. 
4 were not included in the Change Order when he signed 
it. However, that position is directly contrary to the 
deposition testimony of Owner, Connie M. Davis, when 
she stated under oath that the same key provisions 
were in Change Order No. 4 and were discussed between 
the Owners prior to the signing of such Change Order 
by Owner, Richard J. Davis. 
Surely it must be conceded that the duress 
issue was material to the Contractor's recovery of 
judgment on the Note and that whether the Owners agreed 
to Change Order No. 4 was material to whether the Own-
ers had waived the alleged cause of action described 
in their Counterclaim. In Lawson Supply Company v. 
General Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 27 U.2d 821, 493 
P.2d 607 (1972), this court held that the costs of 
depositions may be taxed in a proper case and indicated 
that the test for such determination "is whether the 
deposition was necessarily obtained in the sense that 
the taking of the deposition and its general content 
were reasonably necessary for the development of the 
case in the light of the situation then existing." In 
-31-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lawson it was pointed out that at least one fact was 
discovered by deposition which was of great signifi-
cance to the prevailing party's case. Certainly, the 
same can be said for the case at bar where the deposi-
tions not only uncovered facts of great significance, 
but also uncovered facts that were directly contrary 
to previous positions taken by the Owners under oath. 
Note also, that in the case at bar, the Contractor did 
not take the depositions of the Owners until after the 
Contractor had received the Owners' response to the 
Contractor's interrogatories. 
Having put the Contractor to the expense of 
taking their depositions because of their untruthful 
affidavits and answers to interrogatories, the Contrac-
tor contends that it is entitled to have the Owners pay 
for such conduct by paying for the costs of their depo-
sitions. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Change Order No. 4 and all of the other 
subsequent documents agreed to by the Owners superseded 
the reservation of any alleged claim as provided in 
Change Order No. 2, and because the Owners' final pay-
ment on the Contract expressly waived any such alleged 
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claim, the trial court correctly sustained the Contrac-
tor's objection to the admissibility of the Owners' evi-
dence, and the trial court correctly granted the Con-
tractor's Motion for a Directed Verdict after the Owners 
rested their case in chief. Accordingly, the Contractor 
is entitled to have the judgment of the trial court af-
firmed. 
Because the lower court's Memorandum Decision 
of October 20, 1977 is based upon the erroneous finding 
that the Owners' depositions were not used at trial and 
because such Memorandum Decision apparently did not take 
into consideration the practical and reasonable necessity 
of the Owners' depositions in this matter, the Contrac-
tor is entitled to have judgment in its favor and against 
the Owners for an additional $516.75. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kent B Linebaugh 
JARDINE AND BALDWIN 
700 Commercial Security Bank 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 532- 7700 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 16th day of March, 1978, two copies 
of this Brief of Respondent were served upon counsel 
for Defendants-Appellants by delivering such copies to 
the office of David K. Smith, 4735 Highland Drive, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84117. 
~·~ ~6-l ~ 
Kent B Linebaugh 
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